Motivated tactician
The motivated tactician is a framework rather than an effect: it holds that people pick among thinking strategies according to their goals, so only its particular predictions can be tested.
The motivated tactician is a framework rather than an effect: it holds that people pick among thinking strategies according to their goals, so only its particular predictions can be tested.
Fiske and Taylor describe five successive pictures of the social thinker: consistency seeker, naive scientist, cognitive miser, motivated tactician and activated actor. Their fourth edition dates the motivated tactician to the 1990s and glosses it as a fully engaged thinker with several cognitive strategies available, who chooses among them, consciously or not, on goals, motives and needs. The claim is about strategy selection, not about a direction of error.
It predicts that the same perceiver will sometimes take a shortcut and sometimes think hard, and that a goal manipulation will move which one happens. Nothing in it says whether the resulting judgement will be too harsh, too generous or too confident. Its concrete form is the continuum model of impression formation, in which perceivers start from a category and move towards attribute-based impressions when category fit is poor or motivation is high. That model, and not the label, is what carries testable content.
No replication attempt was found. That is a fact about the literature, not a verdict on the effect. The other 88.
No replication located No replication of the motivated tactician was located, because there is no motivated-tactician experiment to repeat. The tested claims sit one level down, and they disagree.
No replication attempt was found for this effect. That is not evidence that it fails: the search came up empty, and an absence in the literature says nothing either way. How this index searches.
Two ways of reading an applicationillustration
A manager skimming forty applications sorts them by what the first line suggests. Handed the three people she will work beside, she reads every line. Nothing about the applicants changed, only what she needs the judgement for.
The stranger you will see againillustration
A guest at a party places another guest in a type and moves on. Told he is to be her partner on a long piece of work, she starts collecting the details the type does not cover. The framework predicts the switch and says nothing about which reading is fairer.
The purchase that has to be explainedillustration
Choosing a kettle for oneself takes a moment. Choosing one that will have to be justified to a committee takes an afternoon of comparison. The goal decides how much thinking happens, and the kettles are the same either way.
Cases marked as illustrations describe nobody in particular. They are there to make the pattern recognisable, not to report that a particular thing happened.
The framework's evidence is the evidence for its members. Neuberg and Fiske ran three experiments in which participants expected to interact with a young man formerly hospitalised as a schizophrenic. In the first, short-term task-oriented outcome dependency led participants to base impressions on the man's particular attributes rather than on the label, and to spend more time attending to those attributes.
The second showed that the attention effect was not merely a matter of impression positivity. The third manipulated an accuracy goal instead and produced the same shift. The paper's abstract, which is what is open, reports no effect sizes. Fiske and Neuberg then set out the continuum model across 74 pages of Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Fiske and Taylor's own account of the second wave is that it addressed replicability by identifying moderator variables, primarily goals and motivations; their abstract names interdependence and threat, and the body of the same essay adds power.
Three things complicate that account. Kunda and Thagard report two sets of meta-analyses inside a theory paper. Studies of individuating information average r = .71, against r = .25 for stereotypes in the absence of individuating information, and across the 40 studies that varied both orthogonally the averages are r = .69 and r = .19, which the authors restate as 48% of the variance in target evaluations against 4%.
They argue that a parallel constraint-satisfaction network needing little conscious inference reproduces most impression-formation findings. Reynolds and Oakes manipulated interdependence in one experiment and accuracy goals in another, and read their results as showing that whether the salient self-other categorisation is interpersonal or group-based explains variability in impression formation. Carpenter ran a series of meta-analyses of the elaboration likelihood model's argument quality by processing type predictions, k = 134, and reports the data as generally consistent with the predicted interaction.
6 primary research4 replication and reanalysis3 commentary and critique
Fiske's own curriculum vitae lists Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991), Social cognition (2nd ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill, the edition the term is normally placed in. No copy of that edition was opened for this entry, and no source read here shows the phrase inside it. The Internet Archive holds two scans of it, both under controlled lending, and both answer this session with an item-not-available notice rather than a paywall.
What was read is the authors' fourth edition, which says the 1990s view of the social perceiver 'might best be termed the motivated tactician', and their 2020 retrospective, which makes the Motivated Tactician the second of four phases after the Cognitive Miser. Both trace the slogan that thinking is for doing to William James, and cite Fiske's 1992 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology centennial article for it, the fourth edition adding her 1993 paper alongside. That article is closed at the publisher and was checked only against its Crossref record, which confirms the volume, issue and pages.
The framework does not forbid an outcome. A perceiver who takes a shortcut is a motivated tactician conserving effort, and a perceiver who individuates is a motivated tactician pursuing accuracy, so a single study cannot go against the label, only against a named moderator. That is the cost of the design Fiske and Taylor describe as a response to replicability, and it is why this page maps members rather than issuing a verdict.
The search covered Crossref bibliographic queries for replications and meta-analyses of the continuum model and of outcome-dependency impression formation, PubMed, Europe PMC, the Internet Archive and general web search, on 21 September 2026, and turned up follow-on, neuroimaging and modelling work rather than replication attempts. Several documents stayed shut. The 1991 second edition of Social Cognition is held at the Internet Archive only as restricted lending scans.
Fiske's 1992 article and Fiske and Neuberg's 1990 chapter are closed at their publishers and were checked against their Crossref records, ScienceDirect answering with a bot challenge rather than a paywall notice. Reynolds and Oakes was read as its Crossref abstract, which does not say how large their interdependence and accuracy-goal effects were; the Australian National University's repository holds the file but releases it only through a request-a-copy form.
Vrantsidis and Cunningham was read as the publisher's abstract for the version published in September 2026, not as the 2025 preprint, and the two were not compared. The accuracy-nudge replication concerns news sharing, not impression formation, and is quoted here as evidence about goal manipulations in general. Entry 464 covers the elaboration likelihood model, where Carpenter's meta-analysis is weighed at length.
Each of these is named in this entry's own prose as something it gets taken for. Where the two came out differently, that is worth knowing before you quote either.
Calling it a bias is the first error. It names a model of the perceiver, it predicts no systematic departure from any norm, and a list of cognitive biases is the wrong place to look for it. The second error is treating it as a refutation of the cognitive miser. Fiske and Taylor keep the miser as one setting of the tactician, writing that people are sometimes cognitive misers and sometimes deeper thinkers depending on their purpose.
The third is misattributing the miser itself: their fourth edition credits the cognitive miser model to S. E. Taylor's 1981 work, while their own 2020 retrospective ties the Cognitive Miser phase to their 1984 book. A fourth error is reading Fiske and Taylor's claim that the approach addressed replicability as a demonstration that it did. Their claim is that specifying goals and motives as moderators makes findings conditional and therefore reproducible, and the accountability literature shows the same moderator producing attenuation, no effect and amplification.
Neuberg and Fiske's experiments are also read too widely. They show that outcome dependency and accuracy goals push attention towards a target's attributes in a laboratory task built around a psychiatric label, which is not the same as showing that wanting to be fair defeats a stereotype.
Every claim on this page was held against these sources on 2026-09-21. Nothing here is written from memory. Written and checked by Krishna Chagti; how entries are written and corrected. Found a mistake? Report it, with the sentence and a source.